Israeli Admission: Armed Gaza Militias Failed—And Could Turn Against Israel
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Israeli analysts and former intelligence officials are increasingly acknowledging that Israeli-backed militias have failed to challenge Hamas in Gaza.
Key Takeaways
- Israeli-backed militias have failed to emerge as a meaningful alternative to Hamas.
- Former Israeli intelligence officials warn the project may ultimately threaten Israel itself.
- The groups remain small, isolated, and largely rejected by Palestinians despite extensive Israeli support.
For more than two years, Israel has quietly pursued what many officials hoped would become one of the central pillars of its genocide strategy in Gaza: the creation of locally armed Palestinian groups capable of challenging Hamas, administering territory, and eventually serving as an alternative governing force inside the Strip.
Today, according to an investigation published by the Israeli news outlet Zman Israel, even some of Israel’s own analysts, former intelligence officials, and security experts are openly questioning whether the entire project has failed.
Far from becoming a viable alternative to Hamas, the militias remain fragmented, geographically isolated, dependent on Israeli protection, and largely devoid of public legitimacy.
More alarmingly for Israel, experts now warn that the weapons, training, and capabilities provided to these groups could eventually be turned against the occupation itself.
The report reveals growing frustration inside Israeli policy circles as efforts to engineer a new political reality in Gaza continue to fall short.
A Project Built in Secrecy
According to Zman Israel, Israel has spent the past year supplying anti-Hamas armed groups with extensive support, including weapons, intelligence, food supplies, logistical assistance, air support, and medical treatment for wounded fighters inside Israel.
The investigation points to evidence suggesting that some groups may now be receiving increasingly sophisticated military equipment.
In May, one militia published footage showing one of its members operating what appeared to be a large military-grade drone, prompting fresh concerns among Israeli observers regarding the nature of the support being provided.
Yet despite the resources invested, much of the project remains shrouded in secrecy.
Israeli authorities have repeatedly refused to answer questions regarding the militias’ structure, funding, operational objectives, or long-term role in Gaza.
The Israeli military declined to comment on whether advanced equipment seen in militia videos originated from Israel, while the Prime Minister’s Office and Defense Ministry also avoided substantive responses.
The absence of transparency has become one of the central criticisms raised by Israeli experts themselves.
‘Capital of Israeli Fantasies’
Among the sharpest critics is Michael Milshtein, former head of Palestinian affairs in Israeli military intelligence and one of Israel’s most respected analysts on Palestinian society.
“Gaza has become the capital of Israeli fantasies, and that includes operating these militias,” Milshtein told Zman Israel.
His criticism extends far beyond questions of implementation. Milshtein argues that the underlying assumption—that Israel could manufacture a local Palestinian alternative to Hamas through armed proxies—was flawed from the outset.
According to the report, Israel initially attempted to cultivate alternative power structures through clans, influential families, and local figures beginning in early 2024. Those efforts largely collapsed after many families rejected cooperation, fearing both confrontation with Hamas and accusations of collaboration with the occupation.
Netanyahu later acknowledged that Israel had attempted to strengthen clans and local actors to replace Hamas rule, but the strategy produced few tangible results.
Hundreds of Fighters, Little Influence
The report paints a stark picture of the militias’ actual footprint inside Gaza.
Videos, social media posts, and public statements issued by the groups suggest that their combined strength amounts to only a few hundred fighters. Their activities consist primarily of sporadic clashes with Hamas, aid distribution campaigns, patrols in Israeli-controlled areas, and extensive social media efforts designed to project influence.
While some militia leaders claim to administer small enclaves free from Hamas control, the report notes that nearly all of Gaza’s population remains concentrated in areas where Hamas continues to exercise authority.
Researchers interviewed by the publication concluded that the militias have failed to meaningfully alter the balance of power inside the Strip.
Milshtein was particularly blunt. According to the report, he argued that the groups have had “very little significant influence” on Gaza beyond potentially harming Israeli interests.
Palestinians Deeply Skeptical
Perhaps the most damaging finding concerns public legitimacy. The investigation cites testimony from Gaza residents, researchers, and even some militia leaders themselves indicating that the groups have struggled to gain acceptance among Palestinians.
Residents interviewed by the publication reportedly described hostility toward the militias, while others rejected them as entities that do not represent Palestinian national interests.
Even Israeli researchers who support efforts to weaken Hamas acknowledged that the militias remain marginal actors with limited influence over civilian life.
A recurring criticism throughout the report is that none of the current militia leaders possessed significant standing within Palestinian society before the war. Some were reportedly associated with criminal activity, smuggling operations, or other controversial backgrounds.
Milshtein offered perhaps the most devastating assessment. “Clearly, we took the bottom layer of Palestinian society,” he said.
“People who are criminals, questionable figures, involved in terrorism against Israel—out of the belief that they could become an alternative to Hamas.”
Fears of Blowback
The report also reveals growing concern that the project could eventually backfire.
Milshtein warned that transferring advanced capabilities such as drones to militia groups carries serious risks.
“They will eventually turn to terrorism themselves, or Hamas will get hold of the drones and use them against us,” he warned.
Other concerns center on the possibility that weapons distributed to the militias could eventually fall into the hands of Palestinian resistance groups, creating a new security challenge for Israel.
The investigation further notes reports that some militias have participated in the displacement of civilians from areas targeted for expanded Israeli control, raising additional questions regarding their role on the ground.
No Strategy, No Accountability
Beyond questions of effectiveness, the report exposes what critics describe as a profound lack of strategic clarity.
After years of war, Israel still appears unable to answer a fundamental question: what role are these groups actually supposed to play?
The militias have not replaced Hamas. They have not established broad administrative authority. They have not secured meaningful public support.
And according to the report, there has been little serious evaluation of whether the project should continue at all.
Milshtein’s final assessment captures the growing frustration emerging within sections of Israel’s security establishment. “No one stops and asks where all this nonsense is going,” he said.
“Does it help? Does it hurt? Should it be changed or canceled? For two years there has been no examination of this entire affair—not in the Shin Bet and not in the military. There is no examination, and when there is no examination, mistakes simply repeat themselves over and over and over again.”
